• The Doomsday Defense held the Packers to a mere 10y in the period.
• On its first possession of the half, Dallas marched to the 13 where LB Lee Roy Caffey caused a Meredith fumble to end the threat.
• The Cowboys threw Starr for a 16y loss and got the ball back in good field position after the punt. But that drive ended on a missed field goal from the 47.

As the final period began, Dallas had second-and-five at the 50 after a short punt.

• On the first play, Meredith handed to RB Dan Reeves. The former South Carolina quarterback started a left end sweep but stopped and fired a touchdown pass over S Tom Brown to WR Lance Rentzel. After the PAT, Dallas led 17-14.
  Reeves had told Meredith in the huddle, Don, these guys force hard on the run. Let's try fire pitch. Dan, who played quarterback at South Carolina, had executed the play successfully several times during the season.
  Dan: Bob Jeter and Willie Wood were the cornerback and free safety on that side, and they would come up fast when they saw a run coming their way. That made it easier for Lance to get way behind them. Rentzel angled across from his flanker position as if to block Wood. Noticing that Jeter had moved up to stop the run, Reeves cocked his arm and threw downfield. He heard Jeter curse loudly as he threw. Knowing he had been suckered, Bob could only watch as Rentzel caught the ball and easily ran into the end zone.
• The tables had turned completely. Now Green Bay's prospects seemed as bleak as those of the visitors midway through the second quarter. Between Dowler's second touchdown and Reeves' touchdown pass, the Cowboys had held the Packers' offense to -18y in 23 plays.
• On their next two possessions, the Packers gained only 21y, 14 coming on an interference penalty. Don Chandler's field goal try from the 40 missed badly.
• Dallas picked up two first downs to run off five minutes before punting to the GB 31 with 4:50 left.

Starr led his troops onto the field for what might be their last chance.

• The last ten times the Packers had the ball, the most they gained on any possession was 14y.
• Before trotting out, Bart talked to Lombardi. Vince cautioned against anything fancy. "Just try to keep moving the ball."
• As Nitchske left the field, his feet numb and his voice almost gone, he yelled, "Don't let me down!" as he passed the offense.
• Noticing that the Dallas LBs, Howley and Edwards, were dropping back to help on pass coverage, Donny Anderson, Paul Hornung's replacement at halfback, told his quarterback: "If you dump me the ball, I can get eight or 10y every play." This advice reinforced what Starr had heard at halftime.
• According to the Packers, everyone was calm in the huddle, especially the Field General. "We're going in," he said.
  Starr: The look in the eyes of the players in the huddle said more about the character of that team than words can express. They were tired. They were frozen. But they knew that they could do it.
  Bowman: Bart looked at everyone in the huddle, and he didn't say anything. We knew this was it, that it was make or break time, that it was probably the last time we were going to see the ball, and nobody had to say anything. We broke the huddle and went to work.

What transpired was arguably the finest clutch drive in NFL history.

• Starr starts with a short pass to Anderson for six after faking it to the halfback. Then Mercein angles at right end for seven and a first down.
• Starr hits Dowler for 13. First-and-ten at the Dallas 43.
• Then a setback as Townes throws Anderson for a 9y loss on a sweep.
• Starr, finding no one open downfield, lobs to Anderson for 12 and hits him again for nine. Donny does an excellent job of keeping his footing as he picks his way through defenders. 2nd-and-19 has become 1st-and-10 at the 31. Two minutes left.
• With Anderson attracting attention, Mercein tells Starr he's open on the left. As Starr drops to pass, he sees Dowler and Anderson covered but, as promised, Mercein is available. So Bart floats the ball to his fullback who catches it while backpedaling, then runs past the linebacker and cornerback before ca­reening out on the 11 to stop the clock.
  Mercein on telling Starr he was open: I'd never done that before, but I knew I was open in the flat, and I knew that the linebacker (Dave Edwards) was taking kind of a steep drop back. So sure enough, I said to Bart, "If you need me, I'll be open over on the left after I check for a blitz pickup." That was your first responsibility as a back, to check for the blitz. If they didn't come, you go out on a pattern. So when Edwards dropped straight back again, I just did a little flare, and Bart laid it out there. I was so open I think he kind of pulled the string on it a little bit, that the ball actually kind of drifted to my outside shoulder instead of catching it on my inside shoulder, which would have been easier. So I had to turn a little bit and snatched it with my hands, which is what I tried to do all the time. I've got pretty big hands and can catch the football. It wasn't a problem catch, but it looked a little more difficult.
• For years to come, Starr will consider the next play his best call of the game: GIVE 54 or the "sucker play" (although Lombardi didn't like the word "sucker"). During the week, Vince told his quarterback to pick a good spot to use it. The formation and start of the play shout sweep, with LG Gale Gillingham pulling to influence All-Pro T Bob Lilly to move laterally. LT Bob Skoronski has to block George Andrie, whom Starr expected to try to cover the area Lilly had left. Starr fakes the pitch but hands to Mercein, who bursts through the hole Lilly vacated to the three.
  Starr: We decided to use Lilly's tremendous quickness and anticipation to our advantage. We pulled our guard, Gale Gillingham, to the right, hoping that Lilly would try to beat him to the point of attack. This would take Lilly out of the play, which was going to be run in the spot where he originally lined up. This was a risky call, but I believed the time had come to try it, as the adrenaline was running full tilt, and Lilly would likely try to make a decisive play for their defense, which he had done so many times.
  Lilly: I recognized the sucker play, but I couldn't get back. It was a play we normally could have made easily, but I slid down, and George slid down.
• Anderson dives ahead for first-and-goal less than a yard from the goal line. If instant replay had been available, he might have been given a touchdown, which would have obviated the drama to come. The Packers call their second timeout of the half with 0:20 remaining.
• Anderson tries the middle again but slips as he takes the handoff, losing his momentum. No gain. Starr uses his final timeout with 16 seconds left.
  Bowman: Bart turned around, and Donny was like a young colt, his legs were going all over the place. He didn't even make it to the line of scrimmage. We might have actually lost some ground on that one.

• Neither suggests kicking a field goal. After nine years, Starr thinks like his coach, which is why Vince gives his quarterback so much latitude.
• Starr wants to go with a wedge play, the running back knifing between center and guard. But he needs RG Jerry Kramer to get good footing to drive Jethro Pugh backward. The Packers have noticed from films that Pugh stands high in his down position, making him the easiest defender to cut down.
• Starr remembers Anderson's slip on the earlier play. He tells Lombardi there was nothing wrong with the plays the Packers had run. It's just that the backs couldn't get their footing. So he suggests, "Why don't I just keep it?"
• "Run it, and let's get the hell out of here," yells Lombardi, just as frozen as everyone else. After Starr returns to the huddle, Director of Player Personnel Pat Peppler walks over to Lombardi and asks what Starr will call. "Damned if I know," snaps Vince.
• On the field, Mercein is "100% positive" his number will be called for an old-fashioned dive play.
  Years later, Landry recalled: We thought they would throw. We thought they probably would go to an option, a rollout run or pass so they could stop the clock [with an incompletion] if it didn't work.
  During the timeout, CBS director Tony Verna consulted his announcer about what he thought Green Bay would do. Pat Summerall voted for a rollout pass. As Summerall recalled, We had a camera in each end zone, and so what we wanted to do was isolate one on each wide receiver. Tony said to the cameraman behind the Cowboys, "You get Dowler." But at that point the cables behind the camera were frozen, and the cameraman couldn't turn it. So he had to leave it behind the Cowboys defense." So by accident the TV audience got the best view of the final play. If it hadn't been for those cables freezing, we wouldn't have had the shot, said Sum­merall.

The stage is set for one of the most historic plays in NFL history.

• In the huddle, Kramer assures Starr he can get good footing.
• So Bart calls "Brown right, 31 wedge." Brown right is the formation, 3 means the fullback, and 1 means the hole between center and right guard.
• Even though the Packers have no quarterback sneak in their playbook to audible to, Starr has decided he will follow Kramer himself.
• On the sideline, Wood and Willie Davis can't bear to watch. Out of timeouts, Lombardi wonders if there'll be enough time to run the field goal unit on if the play fails.
• As the Packers break the huddle, the fans come to life and start to cheer.
• Pugh and the other defensive linemen kick at the frozen field like batters digging in at the plate. But Jethro's toes are numb and he can't get a good foot­hold as he lines up for the snap. Kramer does the same next to C Ken Bowman and finds a patch of relatively soft turf for his right (pushoff) foot.
• Kramer gets off the snap so quickly some think he was offside. With Bowman's help, he cuts Pugh down and back as ordered.
• Mercein starts forward expecting the ball only to see Bart drive into the end zone. As Chuck falls onto the pile, he throws his hands up to make sure the officials don't call him for aiding the ball carrier. Spectators interpret his gesture as the touchdown signal.
  Bob Lilly, Pugh's counterpart on the right side of the Dallas line, recall­ed in 2015: The thing was. We were standing on ice. ... That particular area was just like ice. The only thing we could have done, we talked about it in the huddle, calling timeout and getting a screwdriver and trying to dig some footholes. We knew that they had more people to put up against us. They were gonna run up the middle cause they tried Donny Anderson on a little slant play a play or two before, and he slid down. We could tell by the way they lined up. There wasn't much you could do, 'cause they had 500 or 600 pounds vs. 270 pounds. Jethro took that. ... That wasn't Jethro's fault. It's just the way it was.
• As Tex Maule wrote in his Sports Illustrated article: "Suddenly, for 50,000 people, spring came."
• Don Chandler's PAT kick made the final score Green Bay 21 Dallas 17.

Starr sneaks over behind Kramer and Bowman.